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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Patrick Hartey, the petitioner in this habeas corpus 
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, appeals from an order 
of the district court entered on November 14, 1997, 
adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate 
judge dated April 1, 1997, and denying Hartey's petition 
without an evidentiary hearing. Inasmuch as both the 
magistrate judge and the district court wrote 
comprehensive opinions, see Hartey v. Vaughn, 1997 WL 
710946 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1997) (district court opinion), the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania wrote a published opinion 
on Hartey's direct appeal, see Commonwealth v. Hartey, 
621 A.2d 1023 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), and we recently wrote 
a published opinion in a habeas corpus case brought by 
Thomas McCandless, a codefendant, see McCandless v. 
Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 1999), we only need 
summarize the background of the case. 
 
In August 1982, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania tried 
Hartey and McCandless together in the Philadelphia 
Common Pleas Court for crimes arising from the murder of 
Theodore Stebelski. Originally, the police arrested John 
Barth for the murder, but in part as a result of information 
Barth supplied, the Commonwealth refocused the 
investigation on Hartey and McCandless. The prosecution's 
theory at the trial was that McCandless and Hartey killed 
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Stebelski so that he could not testify against McCandless at 
a criminal trial. Although the prosecution intended to call 
Barth as a witness to testify about the killing, and expected 
that his testimony would directly link Hartey to the murder 
scene, Barth did not appear at trial. The trial judge ruled, 
however, that Barth's preliminary hearing testimony could 
be read into the record as a substitute for his live testimony 
and the court permitted its use against both defendants. 
The jury convicted both Hartey and McCandless offirst 
degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an 
instrument of crime. 
 
Unfortunately, Hartey's original attorneys (not counsel on 
this appeal) did not prosecute his appeal appropriately and 
thus there were substantial delays in his direct appellate 
process. When the appeal finally was prosecuted, Hartey 
presented six issues to the Superior Court, all framed as 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Superior Court 
denied all six claims on the merits in its published opinion. 
See Commonwealth v. Hartey, 621 A.2d 1023. Hartey 
thereafter unsuccessfully sought allocatur from the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Hartey, 
656 A.2d 117 (Pa. 1993), advancing only four of the claims. 
 
Then on October 4, 1996, Hartey filed the proceedings in 
the district court leading to this appeal, raising the 
following four issues which he also had presented to the 
Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts: 
 
       1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ob ject to 
       the Court's accomplice instruction which permitted the 
       conviction of an accomplice based on his joining the 
       actor in `an illegal act' and failed to focus the attention 
       of the jury on whether or not the accomplice shared or 
       harbored the specific intent to kill that had to be found 
       as to the actor. 
 
       2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pr eserve 
       his objections to the improper bolstering of the Barth 
       preliminary hearing testimony in his written post trial 
       motions, and was also ineffective for failing to object to 
       the improper bolstering of the Barth testimony by the 
       prosecutor in her opening address. 
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       3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ob ject to 
       the Court's exclusion of defense witnesses who would 
       have testified to the poor reputation for truth and 
       veracity on the part of the most critical Commonwealth 
       witness, John Barth. 
 
       4. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pr operly 
       preserve his objection to the Court's refusal to answer 
       the first jury inquiry in the affirmative. 
 
On this appeal Hartey raises only the first two issues 
noted above but expands on them as he presents them as 
both ineffective assistance of counsel claims and due 
process claims. Hartey's refocusing of the claims is 
understandable as our order granting the certificate of 
appealability recites as follows: 
 
       The foregoing request for a certificate of appealability is 
       granted for the purpose of deciding whether Hartey's 
       right to due process was denied by: (1) the prosecutor's 
       opening statement and the testimony of Assistant 
       District Attorney Murray which may have led the jury 
       to believe that the prosecution had independent 
       evidence corroborating witness Barth's testimony that 
       was not presented to the jury. See United States v. 
       Molina- Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 704-705 (3d Cir. 1996); 
       United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir 
       1989), overruled in part, on other grounds, by United 
       States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995) (en 
       banc); and (2) the court's instruction regarding the 
       definition of an accomplice. See Smith v. Horn, 120 
       F.3d 400, 411-15 (3d Cir. 1997); Rock v. Zimmerman, 
       959 F.2d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, we must consider our order granting the 
certificate of appealability in the context of this case, which 
established that Hartey pursued a writ of habeas corpus in 
the district court solely on ineffective assistance of counsel 
grounds, and the court denied the writ concluding that 
Hartey was not entitled to relief on that theory. Thus, we 
are constrained to assess Hartey's claims under the Sixth 
Amendment and not under the Due Process Clause. See 
Smith v. Farley, 25 F.3d 1363, 1365 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(claims not raised before district court in habeas petition 
are waived on appeal). 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
At the outset of our discussion of the merits of Hartey's 
claims we refer to our recent opinion in McCandless v. 
Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255. In that habeas corpus proceeding 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, we granted a writ to McCandless, 
Hartey's co-defendant, on the ground "that the prosecution 
did not fulfill its duty to protect McCandless's 
constitutional right to confront the key witness[John 
Barth] against him." See McCandless, 172 F.3d at 258. 
Hartey, however, did not raise this Confrontation Clause 
claim before the Pennsylvania state courts or in the district 
court. In fact, Hartey did not advance this point even in his 
primary briefs to this court; instead, he challenged his 
incarceration based on this confrontation violation only 
after we requested the parties to submit letter briefs 
detailing what effect, if any, McCandless had on this 
appeal. Thus, Hartey cannot raise the confrontation issue 
at this late date, and McCandless cannot control our result 
on this appeal. See Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 156 n.7 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Hartey seeks to avoid this rather obvious result by relying 
on Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 646-47 (11th Cir. 1983), 
for the proposition that "justice" requires that we permit 
him to obtain relief on the basis of McCandless. Certainly, 
we can understand how it might appear to be incongruous 
that only one of two petitioners can obtain relief on the 
basis of a constitutional error apparently applicable to 
both. Nevertheless, habeas corpus law involves the 
application of well-established principles that, among other 
things, recognize the comity between the federal and state 
courts and usually require that a petitioner under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254 present his claims for relief in the first 
instance in the state courts. We are not at liberty to 
disregard these principles because our concept of what 
"justice" might require and thus Hartey's failure to raise the 
Confrontation Clause issue until after argument on this 
appeal bars him from relying on it now. Therefore, we 
confine our discussion to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that are actually before us.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We delayed our decision on this appeal pending disposition of 
McCandless, which was argued before we heard argument in this case. 
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The thrust of Hartey's claim relating to the prosecutor's 
opening statement and Murray's testimony is that they 
invited the jury to believe that independent evidence not 
presented to it corroborated Barth's preliminary hearing 
testimony. Hartey's challenge to the jury instructions 
centers on their alleged failure to inform the jury that it 
could convict him of first degree murder only if it 
determined that he, rather than merely McCandless, had a 
specific intent to kill. 
 
Inasmuch as Hartey (unlike McCandless) filed his habeas 
corpus petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") we must 
apply the standard of review as required by that Act in 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d). The AEDPA greatly circumscribes our 
review of state court decisions. Thus, we recently indicated 
that the AEDPA 
 
       mandates a two-part inquiry; first, the federal court 
       must inquire whether the state court decision was 
       `contrary to' clearly established federal law, as 
       determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
       second, if it was not, the federal court must evaluate 
       whether the state court judgment rests upon an 
       objectively unreasonable application of clearly 
       established Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 
Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(en banc). Accordingly, as we explained in Matteo, section 
2254(d) "firmly establishes the state court decision as the 
starting point in habeas review." Id. at 885. Of course, on 
this appeal we exercise plenary review over the order of the 
district court as that court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing and nothing in the AEDPA or Matteo requires that 
we do otherwise. See Cabrera v. Barbo, 175 F.3d 307, 312 
(3d Cir. 1999); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1991). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Moreover, we further delayed our decision in order to give the parties an 
opportunity to file letter briefs commenting on McCandless. As it 
happens, however, McCandless is of limited significance here because 
that case turned on an issue not properly before us on this appeal. 
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A. Improper Vouching 
 
Hartey's first claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to improper vouching for Barth's 
preliminary hearing testimony, which he alleges illegally 
bolstered the statements of the key witness against him. 
Specifically, Hartey complains that there was improper 
vouching when the prosecutor stated in her opening 
argument that the government's agreement with Barth was 
based on "verifying" his statements, and when Assistant 
District Attorney Murray testified that the agreement was 
conditioned on "corroborating" Barth's information. Hartey 
is correct that federal law establishes that reference to 
extra-record evidence by the government constitutes 
improper bolstering that, in certain circumstances, may 
justify a reversal of a defendant's conviction. See United 
States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(overruled in part, on other grounds, by United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1267 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
Thus, an attorney's failure to object to the government's 
improper vouching for its witnesses could give rise to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, rejected 
Hartey's ineffective assistance claim because it concluded 
that there had not been improper vouching. See Hartey, 
621 A.2d at 1026-27. The court noted first that, under 
state law, it was the government's obligation to provide full 
disclosure about any favorable agreements reached with its 
witnesses. See id. at 1026. Then, it stated that the 
prosecutor's statements and Murray's testimony had not 
referred to extra-record evidence as the government 
presented corroborating evidence during the trial. See id. at 
1027. Specifically, the court pointed to the testimony of the 
medical examiner, who confirmed Barth's account of how 
the murder had occurred, as well as other evidence 
establishing the ill will between McCandless and Stebelski. 
See id. 
 
Applying the Matteo standard, we cannot conclude that 
the Superior Court's application of law was contrary to 
established Supreme Court precedent or was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. A defendant's ineffective assistance of 
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counsel claim can succeed only if he can show that 
counsel's conduct was professionally unreasonable. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064 (1984). Thus, if there is no merit to Hartey's 
claims that the prosecution's statements and Murray's 
testimony should not have been permitted at trial, his 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not having 
objected to their presentation, as it was not unreasonable 
for him to acquiesce in the presentation of proper 
statements and testimony. 
 
We have indicated that a determination of whether there 
has been improper vouching and, if so, whether there 
should be a reversal must be determined on a case by case 
basis. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1264-67. 
Moreover, much as did the Superior Court, we have looked 
to the extensive trial record to determine whether an 
allegedly improper statement in fact referred to extra-record 
evidence. See DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999. 
 
The Superior Court's conclusion that the government 
presented corroborating evidence at Hartey's trial was not 
contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by 
the Supreme Court and was not an unreasonable 
application of Supreme Court jurisprudence. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(2) (stating that district court can grant writ for 
petitioner in state custody if state court decision was based 
on unreasonable determination of the facts). For instance, 
the prosecution presented the medical examiner's opinion 
that the victim, Stebelski, first had been hit with a blunt 
object on the head and then shot in the back. This 
testimony confirmed Barth's statements that McCandless 
had pistol-whipped Stebelski and then shot him as he was 
running away. Other evidence that generally supported 
Barth's statements included testimony that McCandless 
had a motive to kill Stebelski, who had brought various 
criminal complaints against McCandless and shot at 
McCandless' wife's car, that Stebelski came to McCandless' 
garage that day at McCandless' urging, and that the garage, 
which McCandless owned, contained the type of bullets 
used in the shooting. 
 
Hartey argues, however, that this corroborating evidence 
did not verify his involvement in the murder but only that 
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of McCandless. We find this argument unconvincing. The 
prosecutor and Murray spoke merely of corroborating 
Barth's account of how the murder occurred; the evidence 
presented at trial supplied this corroboration. The jury was 
thus free to infer, although it need not have done so, that 
given the accuracy of Barth's account in many respects, his 
statements implicating Hartey were also accurate. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the Superior Court did not 
act unreasonably in finding that there had not been 
improper vouching because the prosecution had in fact 
presented evidence corroborating Barth's statements at 
trial. Like the Superior Court, we have reversed convictions 
based on improper vouching only where we have concluded 
that evidence in the record could not have supported the 
prosecution's statements. See DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999 
(reversing on direct appeal where prosecutor in closing 
argument stated that its witnesses were not liars because 
government does not "take liars" but there was no evidence 
presented at trial of how government ascertains the honesty 
of its witnesses); United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 
698, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing on direct appeal 
where prosecutor stated in closing that had an absent 
witness testified, he would have confirmed the testimony of 
other government witnesses). For us to grant a writ in this 
case would require us to hold that the government never 
may reveal that its agreement with a witness included a 
corroboration requirement, even when it presents 
corroborating evidence at trial. Neither Supreme Court 
jurisprudence nor our own case law requires such a ruling, 
and therefore, applying the Matteo standard, we must reject 
Hartey's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his 
attorney's failure to object to and preserve objections to 
improper vouching.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We also note that this is not a case where the government emphasized 
the corroboration required by its agreement throughout the trial. The 
prosecutor mentioned the verification requirement briefly in her opening, 
and Murray, who testified early in this ten-day trial, referred to it at 
only 
one point in his testimony, within the context of describing Barth's 
agreement with the government. The prosecutor did not discuss the 
issue in her closing statement. 
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B. The Jury Charge 
 
We now consider Hartey's claims that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object and preserve his objection to 
the accomplice liability charge read to the jury. The 
Superior Court explained this issue as follows: 
 
        Appellant next contends that trial counsel was 
       ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's jury 
       charge. Specifically, appellant argues that the court's 
       charge directed the attention of the jury to the state of 
       mind of the co-defendant and permitted appellant's 
       conviction based on the state of mind of the co- 
       defendant. Appellant asserts that the court never 
       informed the jury that in order to convict appellant of 
       first degree murder it had to find, beyond a reasonable 
       doubt, that appellant had the specific intent to kill. 
 
Commonwealth v. Hartey, 621 A.2d at 1028. Once again, 
the Superior Court disposed of the issue by looking at the 
underlying merit of Hartey's claim; it found that counsel 
was not ineffective because the jury instructions were 
correct. 
 
We need not evaluate the accomplice liability instruction 
itself because we conclude that the record establishes that 
Hartey's counsel was effective on this issue by making and 
preserving his objections. In any event, the Superior Court 
considered Hartey's challenge to the accomplice liability 
instruction, and thus Hartey suffered no prejudice from 
counsel's alleged failure to preserve his objections to the 
instruction. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 
2068 (defendant must show prejudice caused by counsel's 
conduct to succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim). 
 
As we have indicated, the trial transcript shows that 
Hartey's counsel did object to the accomplice liability 
charge. As the district court discussed in its decision, the 
transcript reveals that Hartey's counsel sought changes to 
the accomplice liability instruction that the trial judge 
rejected. For instance, counsel asked for the accomplice 
charge to include an instruction that the jury should 
consider the evidence against each defendant separately. 
The judge rejected this instruction and counsel noted his 
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objections for the record. Finally, when the jury showed its 
confusion about the nature of accomplice liability by asking 
during its deliberations whether two individuals tried for 
the same charge could be innocent or guilty of different 
degrees of murder, Hartey's counsel vigorously argued that 
the trial court should simply answer this question yes. 
Such an answer implicitly would have told the jury that it 
had to consider the intent of each defendant separately. 
The judge disagreed with Hartey's counsel, stating his view 
that, legally, the answer to the question should be no. 
Ultimately, over counsel's objection, the court asked the 
jurors to rephrase their question and then re-read to them 
the charge it previously had given on accomplice liability. 
Based on these facts, and particularly in light of the 
Superior Court's consideration of Hartey's challenge to the 
instruction on the merits, we find that Hartey's counsel was 
not ineffective under Strickland. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons the order of November 14, 
1997, will be affirmed. 
 
                                11 
  
NOONAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
Before the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts, 
Hartey's first point on appeal was this: "Trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the Court's accomplice 
instruction which permitted the conviction of an accomplice 
based on his joining the actor in `an illegal act' and failed 
to focus the attention of the jury on whether or not the 
accomplice shared or harbored the specific intent to kill 
that had to be found as to the actor." 
 
Hartey made ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to 
this instruction his first claim in his habeas petition to the 
district court. As the majority observes, it is this claim that 
is before us now. 
 
Hartey was tried for a murder committed by McCandless, 
as to which the state's theory was that Hartey was an 
accomplice. The trial court instructed the jury: "A 
defendant is guilty of a crime if he is an accomplice of 
another person who commits a crime. He is an accomplice 
if with the intent of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the crime, he solicits, commands, 
encourages, requests the other person to commit it, or aids, 
agrees to aid or attempts to aid the other person in 
planning or committing it. . . . You may find the defendant 
guilty of a crime on the theory that he was an accomplice 
as long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the crime was committed and that the defendant was an 
accomplice of the person who committed it." 
 
The trial court went on to define murder in thefirst 
degree. It instructed the jury that first degree murder was 
an intentional killing. Intentional killing, the court said, 
was "by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any 
other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. 
Therefore, in order to find the defendants guilty of murder 
in the first degree, you must find that the killing was a 
wilful, deliberate, and premeditated act. You must ask 
yourself the question, Did the defendants have the wilful, 
deliberate and premeditated specific intent to kill at the 
time of the killing?" 
 
Defense counsel did not competently object to these 
instructions. The instructions, however, permitted the jury 
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to convict Hartey of first degree murder if it found that he 
had the intent of promoting McCandless's crime of murder. 
Under Pennsylvania law, specific intent to kill is an 
ingredient of first degree murder. See Smith v. Horn, 120 
F.3d 400, 411 (3rd Cir. 1997). The trial court omitted this 
factual requirement and so instructed the jury in a way 
contrary to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 
(1979). Defense counsel's failure to object to Sandstrom 
error constituted ineffective assistance. It fell below 
professional standards of competence and there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the 
result of the proceedings would have been different. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). 
 
The commonwealth contends that the jury instructions 
were correct as the decision of the Superior Court so holds, 
Commonwealth v. Hartey, 621 A.2d 1023, 1028 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1993), and that this decision of state law binds this 
court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). But the omission in a jury instruction 
of an element of the crime is contrary to Sandstrom; the 
Superior Court's endorsement of the error does not supply 
the omission or correct the error. 
 
The majority in this court states: "We need not evaluate 
the accomplice liability instruction itself because we 
conclude that the record establishes that Hartey's counsel 
was effective on this issue by making and preserving his 
objections." But in no way did counsel point out the 
Sandstrom error. No one looking at the vague and halting 
remonstrance of counsel could imagine that he was calling 
the attention of the trial judge to a problem of 
constitutional dimensions and citing to Supreme Court 
authority already five years old and already employed to 
vacate a number of state criminal convictions. See e.g., 
Arroyo v. Jones, 685 F.2d 35, 39-41 (2d Cir. 1982); Guthrie 
v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 683 F.2d 820, 826 (4th 
Cir. 1982). 
 
The majority opinion goes on to say, "In any event, the 
Superior Court considered Hartey's challenge to the 
accomplice liability instruction and thus Hartey suffered no 
prejudice from counsel's alleged failure to preserve his 
objections to the instructions." But the Superior Court 
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reached the unconstitutional conclusion that the 
accomplice instructions were correct; and therefore the 
Superior Court did not adequately address Hartey's 
contention that his counsel failed to object to them. 
 
The Superior Court contented itself with noting that the 
trial court's charge on accomplice liability had "mirrored 
the relevant statutory definitions" and that the trial court 
had told the jurors to ask themselves if "the defendants" 
had the "premeditated specific intent to kill at the time of 
killing." Commonwealth v. Hartey, 621 A.2d at 1028. The 
reference to "the defendants" in the plural did not save a 
charge that had unequivocally told the jury they could find 
Hartey to be guilty as an accomplice to murder if he had 
had the intent of promoting the killing. The single reference 
to "defendants" was cloudy; it was not specified that each 
of the defendants must independently have the specific 
intent to kill; a juror could reasonably have understood 
that the intent of one defendant should be attributed to the 
other as the instruction on accomplice suggested. At the 
very least, the instruction, if taken to require the specific 
intent to kill on the part of the accomplice, was 
contradicted by the instruction on accomplice liability. 
Contradictory instructions cancel each other out, leaving no 
instruction. They do not cure the Sandstrom error. The 
error was of constitutional dimension. See Smith v. Horn, 
120 F.3d at 415. So was counsel's failure to object to it. 
 
The commonwealth has a fallback position: the error was 
harmless because the jury convicted Hartey of conspiracy 
to murder, and conspiracy to murder is an agreement 
intentionally to kill. The commonwealth relies on the trial 
court's instruction that first degree murder consists in 
intentional killing. But the trial court's instruction on 
conspiracy to murder blunted the focus on intentional 
killing by stating that the jurors would have tofind that in 
planning or committing murder "the defendants do so with 
the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
crime of murder." Specific intent to kill was not noted. That 
the jury was in fact at sea because of the erroneous 
instruction is confirmed by their note during deliberations 
asking the court "to explain what an accomplice is 
according to law" in response to which the court magnified 
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its error by repeating its accomplice instructions without 
objection. In any event, the commonwealth's point has no 
relevance now. Hartey was sentenced to no less thanfive, 
and no more than ten, years on the conspiracy count, the 
term to run concurrently with his life imprisonment for 
murder. Long ago he finished his sentence for conspiracy. 
 
Hartey's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
prosecution for murder suffices for him to be accorded 
habeas. Two further considerations make grant of the great 
writ not only legally appropriate but morally fair. First, 
review of Hartey's case is narrowly circumscribed by the 
AEDPA because no less than three members of the bar 
undertook to represent him in the 1980's and defaulted his 
state appeal by failing to file an appellate brief. The 
Superior Court cured these defaults as best it could by 
reinstating the appeal. No federal remedy exists for the 
harm that they inflicted on Hartey. But no one familiar with 
the AEDPA can doubt that Hartey's position today has 
suffered because of these lapses by his lawyers. 
 
Second, Thomas McCandless, the co-defendant, the 
already-convicted murderer, has been held by this court to 
deserve a new trial. See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 
255, 270 (3d Cir. 1999). It is possible, indeed it is likely, 
that he will walk. The opinion of this court throws out the 
principal testimony offered against him by John Barth 
seventeen years ago, "the only substantial evidence 
implicating McCandless in the murder." Id. at 266. Barth, 
the missing witness whose preliminary hearing testimony 
the state then relied on, is now deceased, apparently having 
committed suicide after being arrested in a drug bust. As 
our opinion in McCandless observes, the state "did not 
expend the minimal effort necessary" to get a warrant for 
telephone records by which they could track Barth and 
have him on hand for the trial. Id. at 268. The prosecutor's 
efforts to locate their star witness were "casual." Id. The 
prosecutor "did not satisfy its Sixth Amendment duty to 
make reasonable good faith efforts to obtain Barth's 
presence at trial." Id. at 270. 
 
Hartey was as deeply injured by the prosecutor's 
procedure as McCandless. This court finds that a 
procedural bar, enacted in the interest of state-federal 
 
                                15 
  
comity, forbids us to consider this injury now. This court 
concedes that the disparate results "might appear to be 
incongruous." Not incongruous, I should say, but unjust. It 
is good that there be a way, not procedurally barred, by 
which the injustice may be avoided. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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